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(E)Racing Trayvon Martin
Cynthia Lee*
INTRODUCTION
As we celebrate the 25th anniversary of Critical Race Theory [CRT], we have much to
celebrate and much work ahead. In its early years, Critical Race Theory was a much-criticized and
denigrated body of scholarship. By and large, critical race scholars were law professors of color
writing about issues of racial subordination and injustice. Their work was criticized as
insufficiently rigorous. 1 The use of narrative or storytelling, a prominent feature of much CRT
scholarship, was criticized as well. 2 Many junior law professors of color were warned by more
senior professors of color not to write about race before acquiring tenure as doing so might
negatively affect their chances of getting tenure.3
Today, CRT, while still viewed negatively by many, has become a much more respected mode
of scholarship. Many law schools today offer courses on Critical Race Theory or Race, Racism,
and the Law. Law professors teaching courses on legal theory and jurisprudence often include a
CRT component in their syllabi. There are several CRT casebooks on the market, so a professor
teaching CRT does not have to cobble together her own materials. 4 CRT scholars are amongst the
most widely cited in the profession. 5
While CRT has come a long way from the days when it was widely disrespected, much work
still needs to be done to address the problems of racial subordination that concern critical race
scholars, particularly in the criminal justice arena. Our prisons are still filled with Black and Brown
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See generally Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745, 1749 (1989);
DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW
(1997); Daniel Subotnik, What’s Wrong with Critical Race Theory?: Reopening the Case for Middle Class Values, 7
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 681 (1998).
2
Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 807, 814–19, 835–42 (1993); Subotnik, supra note 1, at 687–91.
3
Richard Delgado recounts his experience as a junior professor of color being “told by a number of well-meaning
senior colleagues to . . . establish a reputation as a scholar in some mainstream legal area and not get too caught up in
civil rights or other ‘ethnic’ subjects,” a story familiar to many professors of color concerned about racial justice issues.
Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561
(1984). When I was an untenured professor, I was warned by my more senior colleagues—colleagues who wanted to
see me succeed and get tenure—that it would be risky for me to write about race. I was told that one of my other
colleagues of color had co-authored a paper when she was pre-tenure that had “Critical Race Theory” in the title, and had
gotten flak for doing this from senior colleagues who were hostile to writings about race.
4
See DERRICK A. BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW (6th ed. 2008); CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 3d ed. 2013); RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, CRITICAL
RACE THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (2d ed. 2012); JUAN PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES, CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A
DIVERSE AMERICA (2d ed. 2007); GLORIA J. BROWNE-MARSHALL, RACE, LAW, AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: 1607 TO PRESENT
(2007).
5
See Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of all Time, 110 MICH. L. REV.
1483, 1489–93 (2012) (noting that critical race theorists such as Richard Delgado, Mari Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence,
Angela Harris, Neil Gotanda, and Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw are some of the most widely cited legal scholars); Fred
R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Legal Scholars, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 409, 424–26 (2000) (noting that critical race theorists
such as Richard Delgado, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, and Angela Harris are some of the most widely cited legal
scholars); Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles Revisited, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 751, 751 (1996) (noting
that a high percentage of the most widely cited articles are written by critical race theorists).

inmates. 6 “More than 60% of the people in prison are racial and ethnic minorities,” and one out of
every ten Black men in their 30s is incarcerated on any given day. 7 These numbers are largely due
to socio-economic conditions that encourage criminal behavior, but are also partly due to media
focus on Black and Brown men caught up in the criminal justice system, marking them as more
vulnerable to police stops and arrests. 8
In addition to the problem of racial disparity in mass incarceration, another area of concern is
the differential treatment of capital defendants, which often turns on the race of the victim. This
problem was highlighted in the Baldus study, referenced in the U.S. Supreme Court decision
McCleskey v. Kemp. 9 David Baldus, Charles Pulaski, and George Woodworth examined over
2,000 capital murder cases that occurred in Georgia during the 1970s.10 They found that defendants
charged with killing White victims received the death penalty in 11% of the cases, but defendants
charged with killing Black victims received the death penalty in only 1% of the cases. 11 They also
found that jurors imposed the death penalty in 22% of the cases involving Black defendants and
White victims, but only 3% of the cases involving White defendants and Black victims, and 1% of
the cases involving Black defendants and Black victims. 12 The Baldus study also found that
prosecutors sought the death penalty in 70% of the cases involving Black defendants and White
victims, but did the same in only 19% of the cases involving White defendants and Black victims. 13
The race of the victim continues to play a prominent role in capital cases today. 14 The race of the
defendant affects jury verdicts as well, with jurors treating Black defendants much more punitively
than similarly situated White defendants. 15
The persistence of racial disparity in the treatment of defendants charged with interracial
crimes of violence is perplexing in light of the egalitarian attitudes most Americans embrace today.
Social science research on implicit social cognition suggests one reason for this seeming
inconsistency between the positive egalitarian attitudes most Americans embrace and the
differential treatment of Black and White defendants charged with interracial crimes of violence.
6

I purposely capitalize the letter “B” in “Black” and “W” in “White” to acknowledge the fact that Black and
White are socially constructed racial categories.
7
Racial Disparity, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/template/page.cfm?id=122
(last visited Oct. 22, 2014) (“For Black males in their thirties, 1 in every 10 is in prison or jail on any given day.”).
8
NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, THE S ENTENCING P ROJECT, RACE AND PUNISHMENT: RACIAL PERCEPTIONS OF CRIME
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POLICIES
20–23
(Sept.
3,
2014)
available
at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_Race_and_Punishment.pdf.
9
481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987).
10 Id.; see generally David C. Baldus, Charles Pulaski & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of Death
Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661, 680 (1983); David C.
Baldus, George Woodworth, & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Monitoring and Evaluating Contemporary Death Sentencing
Systems: Lessons from Georgia, 18 UC DAVIS L. REV. 1375, 1399–1406 (1985).
11 McClesky, 481 U.S. at 286.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 287.
14 See Race and the Death Penalty, ACLU (Feb. 26, 2003), https://www.aclu.org/capital-punishment/race-anddeath-penalty (finding that 80 percent of all capital cases involve White victims); Catherine M. Grosso et al., Race
Discrimination and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 525–76 (James R.
Acker, Robert M. Bohm & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed.) (noting that twenty-four of thirty-six empirical studies of death
penalty systems published after 1990 found race of victim effects).
15 See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., NEBRASKA COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE
DISPOSITION OF NEBRASKA CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASES (1973–1999): A LEGAL AND EMPIRICAL
ANALYSIS 108 (2001) (finding that minority offenders were more likely than non-minority offenders to receive more
punitive treatment); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1142 (2012); Grosso et
al., supra note 14 (noting that 9 of 36 empirical studies of death penalty systems published after 1990 found race-ofdefendant effects).

While most Americans think it is wrong to discriminate on the basis of race, they are nevertheless
affected by negative racial stereotypes about Blacks.16 These stereotypes link Blacks with danger,
violence, criminality, laziness, welfare, and incompetence, and encourage implicit racial bias in
favor of Whites over Blacks. 17 Implicit racial bias is often inversely correlated with our explicit
beliefs about race. We may firmly believe that people should be treated equally without regard to
their race or ethnicity, but cannot help thinking about crime, violence, or gangs when we see a
Black individual. 18 Even if an individual knows that it is improper to stereotype, she may not be
able to keep from automatically doing so. 19
Another less obvious reason for the intransigence of racial bias is our adherence to the ideal
of colorblindness. Many, possibly most, people in the United States today believe it is good to be
colorblind—to not see racial difference—out of a belief that recognizing racial difference leads to
discrimination on the basis of race. 20 The problem is that ignoring racial difference can actually
exacerbate the effects of implicit racial bias. It is when we are not paying attention to race that we
are most vulnerable to racial stereotyping. Recent social science research suggests a practical
solution to the problem of implicit racial bias: we can minimize the effects of racial stereotypes not
by ignoring, but by paying more attention to race. 21
In Part One of this essay, I will examine one of the most powerful critical race critiques in the
criminal justice arena, Devon Carbado’s law review article, “(E)Racing the Fourth Amendment,”
which was published over a decade ago in the Michigan Law Review in 2002. 22 In this article,
Carbado leveled a general critique on the then existing scholarship on race and the Fourth
Amendment. He also leveled a more specific critique of Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor’s colorblind ideology as manifested in her opinion for the Court in Florida v. Bostick. 23
16 See generally Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE,
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986).
17 See ROBERT M. ENTMAN, YOUNG MEN OF COLOR IN THE MEDIA: IMAGES AND IMPACTS, JOINT CENTER FOR
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDIES BACKGROUND PAPER 13 (2006); Adeno Addis, “Hell Man, They Did Invent Us:” The
Mass Media, Law, and African Americans, 41 BUFF. L. REV. 523, 555 (1993) (“The image of young black males conveyed
by the mainstream media is one associated with drugs, crime, and violence.”); Leonard M. Baynes, A Time to Kill, the
O.J. Simpson Trials, and Storytelling to Juries, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 549, 550 (1997) (“[T]he image of young
violent Black men is very prevalent in the media.”); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo’s Eighth Chronicle: Black Crime, White
Fears—On the Social Construction of Threat, 80 VA. L. REV. 503, 512 (1994) (noting that Blacks are often depicted as
“violent muggers and burglars”).
18 See Jennifer L. Eberhardt et al., Seeing Black: Race, Crime, and Visual Processing, 87 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 876, 876 (2004). See also CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 138–46 (NYU Press 2003)
(explaining in detail the “Black-as-Criminal” stereotype); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a
Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L. REV. 367, 402–23 (1996) (examining stereotypes about African
Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans).
19 See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE
(2013).
20 See, e.g., Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589 (2009).
21 See generally Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About Race and
Juries? A Review of Social Science Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 997 (2003) (finding that presenting
jurors with race relevant voir dire questions in cases involving interracial violence reduced racial bias in White jurors);
Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom: Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions,
26 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1367 (2000) (finding that in interracial domestic violence cases, White jurors
were more likely to treat White and Black defendants the same if the defendant referred to himself as a White or Black
man when speaking to his girlfriend than if he simply referred to himself as a man); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C.
Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making: Misconceptions, Clarifications, and Unanswered Questions, 27
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 599 (2009) (summarizing authors’ previous research on race salience); Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, White Juror Bias: An Investigation of Prejudice Against Black Defendants in the American Courtroom, 7
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 201, 202 (2001) (noting that “racial norms in society have shifted dramatically”).
22 Devon W. Carbado, (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946 (2002).
23 501 U.S. 429 (1991).

In Part Two, I fast forward to 2013 and draw parallels between Carbado’s critique of the colorblind
ideology apparent in the Bostick decision and my own critique of the colorblind handling of the
July 2013 trial of George Zimmerman in the shooting death of Trayvon Martin.
This essay broadens Carbado’s analysis in at least two ways. First, whereas Carbado examined
the Fourth Amendment as a site for racial construction, my commentary focuses on race
construction in the doctrine of self-defense. The Fourth Amendment and the defense of selfdefense are two doctrinal sites that most people think have little in common. Both doctrines,
however, are connected by reasonableness requirements that enable beliefs and attitudes about race
to influence outcomes. Second, while Carbado’s critique focused on the Supreme Court as a site
where race is constructed, my critique draws attention to the dynamics of race outside the Supreme
Court context. Most legal scholarship focuses on Supreme Court cases. My analysis, in contrast,
calls attention to the ways in which race is constructed by other actors in the legal system, including
the trial judge, the prosecutor, the defense attorney, and the jury. I offer a common-sense solution
to the intransigent problem of racial bias: calling attention to race to encourage jurors to consciously
combat stereotypical thinking.
I. (E)RACING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In (E)Racing the Fourth Amendment, Devon Carbado leveled three basic critiques at the then
existing scholarship on race and the Fourth Amendment. First, Carbado lamented that the existing
scholarship failed to examine the nexus between the development of Fourth Amendment doctrine
and ideological notions of what race is and what race should be. 24 The heart of the problem,
according to Carbado, was that the existing scholarship failed to engage with CRT, and thus failed
to recognize the role that courts play in constructing racial ideologies and legitimizing racial
inequality. 25
Second, Carbado noted that the existing scholarship on race and the Fourth Amendment failed
to fully examine the ways in which Fourth Amendment doctrine affected the everyday lives of
persons of color. 26 In particular, Carbado noted that the existing scholarship failed to recognize
that people of color are socialized into engaging in particular kinds of performances for the police. 27
These performances include ultra-deferential acts motivated by fear of police violence.28 Since
many of the U.S. Supreme Court's tests in the Fourth Amendment arena turn on what the reasonable
person would have felt or believed, ignoring racial difference can lead lower courts to draw
conclusions that may not reflect the lived realities of many Black individuals. For example, the
test for a “seizure” of the person is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. 29 A
reasonable Black man who has been stopped and harassed by police in the past might not feel free
to leave when approached by police officers who start asking questions. If the race of the defendant
is not taken into account, however, the decision-maker may decide that a reasonable person
(understood as the average White middle class individual who has never had a negative experience
with the police) would have felt free to leave.
Third, Carbado argued that the then existing scholarship on race and the Fourth Amendment
was under-inclusive, focusing mostly on Blacks and ignoring the fact that race-based policing is a
multi-racial phenomenon. 30 Latinos, Asian Americans, and other racial and ethnic minorities are
24

Carbado, supra note 22, at 965.
Id at 965–66.
26 Id. at 966.
27 Id. (“Few people have noted that people of color are socialized into engaging in particular kinds of
performances for the police.”).
28 Id. (“The burden includes, but is not limited to, internalized racial obedience toward, and fear of, the police.”).
29 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
30 Carbado, supra note 22, at 967.
25

also the victims of racial profiling by police. Importantly, Carbado pointed out that it is easier to
ignore problems of policing if these problems are seen as practices affecting just Black people.31
Drawing attention to the ways in which police activity affects people of all races can help bring
about reform more easily than narrowly focusing on problems faced by Blacks alone. 32
Carbado’s project was to address these deficiencies by examining Fourth Amendment case
law as a jurisprudential site where the Supreme Court engages in the production of race. 33 The
Supreme Court, according to Carbado, constructs race by providing a particular conception of what
race is. 34 The Court, Carbado argued, “conceptualizes race primarily through the racial lens of
colorblindness.” 35 While perhaps motivated by good intentions, the Court’s colorblind ideology
results in persons of color being under-protected and over-policed. 36 In other words, the Fourth
Amendment is erased for people of color, hence the title of Carbado’s article. 37 Carbado analyzed
several Fourth Amendment cases to demonstrate his claims. In this essay, I focus on Carbado’s
critique of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s colorblind ideology as reflected in Florida v. Bostick. 38
In Florida v. Bostick, two Broward County Sheriff’s Department officers boarded a bus, which
had made a temporary stop in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. 39 Without any particularized or articulable
reason to believe Terrance Bostick was involved in criminal activity, the officers approached
Bostick and asked to see his bus ticket and identification. 40 Bostick complied. 41 The officers then
asked Bostick if they could search his luggage. 42 There is some dispute over whether Bostick
consented. 43 Regardless, the officers searched Bostick’s luggage and, after finding contraband
within, arrested Bostick and charged him with trafficking in cocaine. 44
While the Bostick Court refrained from definitively deciding whether Bostick had been
“seized” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 45 Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court,
made clear the Court’s skepticism that any such seizure had occurred, writing, “The facts of this
case, as described by the Florida Supreme Court, leave some doubt whether a seizure occurred.”46
If Bostick was not seized, as the Court intimated, this would mean that there was no violation of
Bostick’s Fourth Amendment rights since the Fourth Amendment only applies when the
government searches or seizes persons or property.
The suggestion that Bostick was not seized was surprising because the average bus passenger
most likely would not feel free to leave if confronted by law enforcement officers conducting an
31

Id. at 967.
Some have suggested that the reason why the ACLU’s lawsuit against the New York City Police Department
for its Terry stop and frisk policy and practice of racial profiling drew so much sympathy for the plaintiffs was because
it highlighted a broad swath of unjustified stops and frisks involving Latinos as well as African Americans, and most
Americans could see themselves in the shoes of the person who was stopped and frisked. Miriam Gohara, Senior
Attorney, Federal Capital Habeas Project, New Haven, CT, Panel Discussion, Stop and Frisk as a Policing Tactic: The
Situation Post-Floyd, AALS Annual Meeting, New York, NY (Jan. 3, 2014).
33 Carbado, supra note 22, at 967.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 968 & n.109.
36 Id. at 969.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 975–90.
39 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431 (1991).
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 432.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 437.
46 Id.
32

investigative sweep of the bus for narcotics. As Janice Nadler explains, a police officer has no need
to shout in order for his request for permission to search to be perceived as a command by the
person he has stopped. 47 Prior to deciding Florida v. Bostick, the Court had established a “free to
leave” test for determining whether an individual has been seized within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. 48 Under this test, a person is “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes if a reasonable
person in his shoes would not have felt free to leave. 49 The Bostick Court, however, modified the
“free to leave” test, establishing that in cases where factors not attributable to the police contribute
to an individual’s feeling that he is not free to leave, the test for a seizure of the person is “whether
a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the
encounter.” 50 If a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or terminate
the encounter, then no seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment has occurred. In
Bostick, a factor not attributable to the police—the fact that the bus could depart with the
passenger’s luggage—might cause the average bus passenger to feel that he was not free to leave
the bus. 51 Thus, the appropriate inquiry, according to the Bostick Court, was whether a reasonable
person in Bostick’s shoes would have felt free to decline the officer’s request or terminate the
encounter with the police, not whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. 52
Carbado notes that in her opinion, Justice O’Connor never mentions the fact that Bostick is
Black; nor does she note on the race of the officers. 53 Carbado suggests that to say Justice
O’Connor ignores race is only partially correct. 54 To Carbado, “it is more accurate to say that
[Justice O’Connor’s] analysis constructs Bostick and the officers with the racial ideology of
colorblindness.” 55 As Carbado explains, “[T]he problem is not that Justice O’Connor does not see
race, but rather that she sees race in a particular way.” 56 The reason Justice O’Connor does not
mention race is because she thinks race does not matter.57 The race of Bostick and the officers is
irrelevant to Justice O’Connor. 58
The decision to construct race as irrelevant is consistent with Justice O’Connor’s race
jurisprudence in other contexts. In her Due Process jurisprudence, Justice O’Connor has opined
that racial classifications of any sort are bad, even when intended to remedy past discrimination
against racial minorities. 59
Carbado points out that seeing race as irrelevant is not a race neutral position as many might
think. Not mentioning race conveys a particular message about race. Carbado explains:
Describing Bostick as black is no more racially conscious than describing him as a man.
Both descriptions send a particular message about race. In the former, that race is
relevant. In the latter, it is not. In both instances, attention is being paid to race. Neither
description is race neutral. 60
47
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50
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52
53
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59
60

Janice Nadler, No Need to Shout: Bus Sweeps and the Psychology of Coercion, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 180.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553 (1980).
Id. at 554.
Bostick, 501 U.S. at 436.
Id.
Id. at 447.
Carbado, supra note 22, at 977.
Id. at 977–78.
Id. at 978.
Id.
Id. at 979.
Id.
Id. at 980 (citing Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993)).
Id. at 979.

In other words, we explicitly invoke race when we think race is or should be relevant.61 We
don’t mention race when we think race is or should be irrelevant.
Carbado recognizes that Justice O’Connor’s decision to ignore race was likely motivated by
good intentions: “From Justice O’Connor’s perspective, textually referencing [Bostick and the
officers’] respective racial identities would entrench existing negative racial impressions of—that
is, stigmatize—both.” 62 Justice O’Connor may have feared that racially identifying Bostick as a
Black man would invoke the stereotype of the Black man as criminal and racially identifying the
officers as white would invoke the stereotype of the White racist cop. 63 To prevent negative
stereotypes from having any effect, she chose to speak about Bostick and the officers as simply
individuals without reference to race. 64
The problem, according to Carbado, is that representing Bostick and the officers as race-less
denied the social reality these individuals faced.65 Bostick was in fact Black and the officers were
in fact White, 66 but under Justice O’Connor’s redefinition, Bostick became “a black man without
the presumption of criminality and the police [became] white officers without the presumption of
a racist identity.” 67 The problem is that “Bostick may have held and acted on a racial presumption
that the police officers were racists and the police may have held and acted on a racial presumption
that Bostick was a criminal.” 68 Indeed, as Carbado notes, “Most, if not all, black people—
especially black men—are apprehensive about police encounters.” 69 African Americans are
accustomed to hearing about and experiencing police abuse first-hand. 70 When a Black man is
approached by a police officer, he may reasonably fear being beaten (as Rodney King was beaten
by Los Angeles police officers who felt he was a threat to them when he was lying prone on the
ground trying to comply with their orders) 71 or shot (as Amadou Diallo was when attempting to
show his ID to plainclothes NYPD officers who erroneously thought the West African immigrant
was a rape suspect reaching for a gun) 72 if he does not comply with the officer’s every request.
Thus, when Bostick was confronted by the Broward County law enforcement officers, it is likely
that he did not feel free to leave, terminate the encounter, or decline the officers’ requests for
identification and consent to search, and it is likely that the average Black man in Bostick’s shoes
would have felt the same way. 73 Under either the traditional test for a seizure of the person or the
modified test enunciated in Bostick, one should conclude that Bostick was “seized” within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The social reality just described, however, is obscured if we
61

Id. at 980.
Id. at 981.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at 981–82.
66 Id. at 982.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 985.
70 Id.
71 See
Jim Kavanagh, Rodney King, 20 Years Later, CNN (Mar. 3, 2011, 8:56 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2011/US/03/03/rodney.king.20.years.later/;
see
also
Rodney
King,
BIOGRAPHY.,
http://www.biography.com/people/rodney-king-9542141 (last visited Nov. 9, 2014).
72 Jane Fritsch, The Diallo Verdict: The Overview; Four Officers in Diallo Shooting are Acquitted of All Charges, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 26, 2000, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/26/nyregion/diallo-verdict-overview-4-officers-diallo-shootingare-acquitted-all-charges.html.
73 For this reason, Tracey Maclin argues that the race of the defendant should be taken into account as part of the
totality of the circumstances when a court assesses reasonableness in the Fourth Amendment context. Tracey Maclin,
Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 360 (1998).
62

ignore the fact that Bostick was Black and the officers were White. Ignoring race allows one to
conclude that the reasonable person in Bostick’s shoes would have felt free to decline the officers’
requests and therefore Bostick was not seized. Colorblindness can thus result in less racial justice
for Black men who are detained by White law enforcement officers.
II. (E)RACING TRAYVON MARTIN’S RACE FROM THE ZIMMERMAN TRIAL
Fast forward to July 2013 when George Zimmerman was tried for murder in the shooting death
of Trayvon Martin in Sanford, Florida. 74 Zimmerman, the neighborhood watch captain for his
neighborhood, 75 was out in his truck one rainy evening when he spotted Trayvon Martin, a young
Black male in a hoodie sweatshirt, who was walking and talking on his cell phone after going to
the store to get a bag of skittles and a can of Arizona watermelon drink. 76 Even though Martin was
doing nothing to objectively indicate criminal behavior, at least nothing that Zimmerman
articulated at that time or more than a year later at his trial, Zimmerman thought Martin looked
suspicious and called 911 to report his suspicions. 77 When Martin noticed Zimmerman following
him, he started walking quickly away. 78 Zimmerman got out of his car and followed Martin.79
Apparently, words were exchanged, and a physical confrontation ensued, ending when Zimmerman
shot Martin in the chest. 80
Zimmerman remained on the scene after the shooting and told police he shot Martin in selfdefense. 81 Zimmerman claimed that after exchanging words with Martin, as he was walking back
to his car, Martin sneaked back to confront Zimmerman and punched him in the face. 82 According
to Zimmerman, Martin threw him to the ground and slammed his head against the concrete several
74 For commentary about the shooting, see Cynthia Lee, Making Race Salient: Trayvon Martin and Implicit Bias
in a Not Yet Post-Racial Society, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1555 (2013); Valena Elizabeth Beety, What the Brain Saw: The Case
of Trayvon Martin and the Need for Eyewitness Identification Reform, 90 DENV. UNIV. L. REV. 331 (2012); Tamara F.
Lawson, A Fresh Cut in an Old Wound—A Critical Analysis of the Trayvon Martin Killing: The Public Outcry, the
Prosecutors’ Discretion, and the Stand Your Ground Law, 23 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 271 (2012); L. Song Richardson
& Phillip Atiba Goff, Self-Defense and the Suspicion Heuristic, 98 IOWA L. REV. 293 (2012); Josephine Ross, The
Supreme Court’s Invisible Hand in George Zimmerman’s Trial for the Murder of Trayvon Martin, 17 BERKELEY J. AFR .AM . L. & P OL’Y (forthcoming 2015) (manuscript on file with author).
75 Dan Barry et al., In the Eye of a Firestorm: In Florida, an Intersection of Tragedy, Race, and Outrage, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2012, at A1; Chris Francescani, George Zimmerman: Prelude to a Shooting, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2012,
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PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-florida-shooting-zimmermanidUSBRE83O18H20120425.
76 Barry et al., supra note 75; Greg Botelho, What Happened the Night Trayvon Martin Died, CNN (May 23,
2012, 10:48 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/05/18/justice/florida-teen-shooting-details/. Although the drink that Martin
was carrying was widely reported by the media as an Arizona iced tea, the drink was actually a can of Arizona watermelon
drink. LISA BLOOM, SUSPICION NATION: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE TRAYVON MARTIN INJUSTICE AND WHY WE CONTINUE
TO REPEAT IT 49 (2014) (noting that the Arizona watermelon drink Martin was carrying is “often mistakenly referred to
as an iced tea because the police logged it incorrectly in their crime scene records”); Lizette Alvarez & Cara Buckley,
Zimmerman is Acquitted in Killing of Trayvon Martin, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2013, at A1, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/us/george-zimmerman-verdict-trayvon-martin.html?pagewanted=all.
77 Barry et al., supra note 75, at A12 (noting that when Zimmerman called 911, he said, “Hey, we’ve had some
break-ins in my neighborhood . . . [and] there’s a real suspicious guy”).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Sari Horwitz, Zimmerman Claims Martin Started Confrontation, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 2012, at A2.
81 See Jason Hanna, Sanford, Florida, Police Answer Questions About Teen’s Shooting Death, CNN (Mar. 21,
2012, 1:50 PM), http://news.blogs.cnn.com/2012/03/21/sanford-florida-police-answer-questions-about-teens-shootingdeath/.
82 Id. See also Frances Robles & Mark Caputo, Tapes Show Sanford Police Grew Skeptical of Zimmerman’s
Story, MIAMI HERALD, (June 21, 2012) http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/06/21/2860569/zimmerman-told-policetrayvon.html.

times. 83 Zimmerman told police he shot Martin only after Martin pinned him to the ground, called
him a mother f---er, said he was going to die that night, and reached for Zimmerman’s gun. 84
Even though the detectives who initially interviewed Zimmerman thought Zimmerman should
be arrested on suspicion of manslaughter, the Florida State Attorney’s Office instructed the police
not to arrest Zimmerman. 85 When word got out that Zimmerman was released without arrest after
shooting the unarmed teenager, thousands took to the streets to protest what was widely perceived
as a racially biased decision not to prosecute. 86 The public protests led the Florida State Attorney’s
Office to reverse its initial decision not to charge Zimmerman with any crime. 87 The State of
Florida ultimately charged Zimmerman with second-degree murder, 88 and his trial began in June
of 2013. 89
A. The Role of the Zimmerman Trial Court in Constructing Race as Irrelevant
While race was clearly a focus of the public protests and media commentary about the case in
2012 after the shooting, race was conspicuously absent from the trial proceedings a little over a
year later. 90 In an early ruling, Judge Debra Nelson, who presided over Zimmerman’s murder trial,
made it clear to both sides that she intended to run a colorblind trial and did not want either side to
call attention to race. In response to a defense motion to preclude the prosecution from referring
to Zimmerman’s activities as “racial profiling,” Judge Nelson ruled that prosecutors could not use
the term “racial profiling” when referring to Zimmerman’s activities the night of the shooting. 91
Judge Nelson’s ruling may have been motivated by a desire to strike a balance between what the
defense wanted (no reference to either “racial profiling” or “profiling”) and what the prosecution
wanted (the ability to use both terms). Whatever the motivation, Judge Nelson’s ruling
83
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84 Id. Lisa Bloom questions Zimmerman’s account. She points out that Zimmerman’s gun was holstered in the
back of his pants, so if Zimmerman was on the ground with Martin on top of him, Martin could not have seen
Zimmerman’s gun. See BLOOM, supra note 76, at 60.
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Arrest in Trayvon Martin Case, TIME (Mar. 29, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/03/29/report-police-initiallywanted-to-make-arrest-in-trayvon-martin-case/ (noting that police investigators did not believe Zimmerman’s story and
wanted to arrest him on the night of the shooting, but State Attorney Norm Wolfram refused to authorize an arrest).
86 NAACP Leads March on Sanford, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 2012, at A3 (reporting that thousands joined a march
through Sanford demanding that Zimmerman be arrested); Ovetta Wiggins, A Rallying Cry for Justice in Teen’s Death,
WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2012, at A3 (reporting that thousands have demonstrated in major cities across the country wearing
hoodies to show solidarity with Martin, who was wearing a hoodie the night he was killed).
87 See Madison Gray, Trayvon Martin Case: George Zimmerman Charged with Second-Degree Murder, TIME
(Apr. 11, 2012), http://newsfeed.time.com/2012/04/11/trayvon-martin-case-george-zimmerman-charged-with-seconddegree-murder/.
88 Sari Horwitz, Charge Filed in Martin Killing, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2012, at A1; Matt Gutman et al., George
Zimmerman Case: Should Charges Be Dropped?, ABC NEWS (Mar. 21, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/US/georgezimmerman-case-charges-dropped/print?id=16392466.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/25/us/zimmerman-trial.html?_r=0.
90 See Cynthia Lee, Denying the Significance of Race: Colorblindness and the Zimmerman Trial, in TRAYVON
MARTIN, RACE, AND “AMERICAN JUSTICE”: WRITING WRONG (Kenneth J. Fasching-Varner et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2014).
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significantly curtailed the government’s ability to discuss the racial implications of Zimmerman’s
initial decision to follow and his subsequent decision to shoot Martin. 92 Just as Justice O’Connor
constructed race as irrelevant in Florida v. Bostick by ignoring the racial identities of Bostick and
the law enforcement officers who confronted him, Judge Nelson constructed race as irrelevant in
the Zimmerman trial by barring the prosecution from referencing the fact that Martin’s race may
have played a role in triggering Zimmerman’s initial suspicions and his subsequent actions. Jurors
were encouraged to view Zimmerman and Martin as simply individuals—or, more accurately, as
simply men—without regard to their racial identity.
Race, however, was closely connected to the events that transpired the night Zimmerman
fatally shot Martin. Just as Terrance Bostick’s racial identity as a Black man likely influenced the
way he perceived the White officers who confronted him on the bus as well as the way they
perceived him, Trayvon Martin’s identity as a young Black male likely influenced the way
Zimmerman perceived Martin and the way Martin perceived Zimmerman. Zimmerman didn't see
a raceless and genderless person walking in his neighborhood. He saw a young Black male in a
hoodie, and thought Martin was suspicious most likely because our society associates young, Black,
and male with crime. 93 The rash of burglaries and attempted break-ins of homes in the
neighborhood by young Black males in the weeks preceding the shooting only strengthened the
association Zimmerman made between young Black men and crime. 94
Zimmerman’s racial identity was also significant. Martin saw a heavy-set, light-skinned man,
and may have assumed that Zimmerman was White. 95 This man was suggesting that Martin had no
right to be walking in the neighborhood, which likely rubbed Martin the wrong way. In the pre92 Michael Muskal, Judge in Zimmerman Trial Limits Racial References, L.A. TIMES, June 22, 2013, at A12
(noting that Judge Debra Nelson ruled just before opening statements that prosecutors could use words like “vigilante”
and “profile,” but could not tell jurors that Zimmerman racially profiled Martin); Lisa Lucas & Corky Siemaszko, George
Zimmerman’s Trayvon Martin Murder Trial Will Not Open with Discussion of Race, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (June 21, 2013,
11:04 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/trayvon-martin-trial-won-open-race-article-1.1378952 (noting
that Judge Debra Nelson would not permit prosecutors to say that Zimmerman “racially” profiled Martin).
93 See CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM
(2003) (explaining the Black-as-Criminal stereotype). Many, if not most, people would have made the same or similar
assumptions, although they probably would not have acted upon those assumptions as Zimmerman did nor admit to
making such assumptions in public. Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cuban received a huge amount of criticism when he
spoke candidly about race, bigotry and fear during an interview about former Clippers owner Donald Sterling’s comments
to his personal assistant, V. Stiviano, asking her not to bring African Americans to Clippers’ home games. Dan Devine,
Mavericks Owner Mark Cuban on Race and Bigotry: ‘We’re All Prejudiced in One Way or the Other,’ YAHOO ! (May
22, 2014 11:39 AM), http://sports.yahoo.com.blogs/nba-ball-dont-lie/mavericks-owner-mark-cuban-on-race-andbigotry--we’re-all-prejudiced-in-one-way-or-the-other-153950475.html. Cuban received criticism for saying, “If I see a
black kid in a hoodie and it’s late at night, I’m walking to the other side of the street.” Id.
94 See Chris Francescani, George Zimmerman: Prelude to a Shooting, REUTERS (Apr. 25, 2012, 5:20 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/25/us-usa-florida-shooting-zimmerman-idUSBRE83O18H20120425 (reporting
that one Black woman who lived in the neighborhood told him, “‘I’m black, OK?’ . . . ‘There were black boys robbing
houses in this neighborhood,’ . . . ‘That’s why George was suspicious of Trayvon Martin’”).
95 Although Zimmerman is mix-raced, see infra, Martin may have thought Zimmerman was White given his
complexion. On how Zimmerman’s race could be read, see Suzanne Gamboa, Trayvon Martin Case: George
Zimmerman’s Race is a Complicated Matter, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 29, 2012, 7:16 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/03/29/trayvon-martin-case-georg_n_1387711.html (describing the confusion
about Zimmerman’s race and noting that responding police described Zimmerman as white). Initial media reports
referred to Zimmerman as a White man. See, e.g., Mike Schneider, Family Wants Answers in Fla. Teen’s Death, YAHOO!
(Mar. 8, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://news.yahoo.com/family-wants-answers-fla-teens-death-162019527.html (“The
neighborhood watch leader is white.”). Zimmerman's family protested, saying Zimmerman was actually a minority since
his mother was of Peruvian dissent. See Renee Stutzman, George Zimmerman’s Father: My Son is Not a Racist, Did Not
Confront Trayvon Martin, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Mar. 15, 2012, 10:42 PM), http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2012-0315/news/os-trayvon-martin-shooting-zimmerman-letter-20120315_1_robert-zimmerman-letter-unarmed-black-teenager
(noting that George Zimmerman’s father delivered a one page letter to the Orlando Sentinel, stating that his son is
Hispanic and grew up in a multi-racial family). Subsequent media reports acknowledged Zimmerman’s mixed race
background. See Francescani, supra note 94.

Civil War era, Blacks had to carry proof that they were free men, not slaves. 96 Many Blacks today
are reminded of this dark history when they are pulled over by police and asked to show
identification. 97 This history might explain in part why Martin may have taken offense at
Zimmerman’s actions—and, if we believe Zimmerman’s account, why Martin might have thrown
the first punch. 98
Martin may have also perceived Zimmerman’s actions as a challenge to his masculinity. As
Angela Harris has explained, men of color who lack power over others sometimes resort to hypermasculine shows of physical aggression to demonstrate their masculinity. 99 Martin was not a
wealthy African-American adult male. He was an African-American male teenager from a family
of modest means. 100 Camille Gear-Rich explains that Martin’s resort to physical violence may have
been a way for him to demonstrate his masculinity. 101
The prosecution not only acquiesced in the judge’s decision to run a colorblind trial, they
embraced a colorblind trial strategy. 102 At the hearing on the pretrial motion on whether the
prosecution could use the term “racial profiling” to describe Zimmerman’s actions the night of the
shooting, prosecutor John Guy told Judge Nelson, “[Profiling] is not a racially charged term unless
it’s made so, and we do not intend to make it a racially charged term.” 103 The prosecution team
was very careful not to call attention to race throughout the rest of the trial.
The prosecution may have been worried that if they called attention to race, jurors would think
they were “playing the race card.” “Playing the race card” is a term of art used to accuse a person
of lying when they claim to have suffered differential treatment on the basis of race.104 Someone
96 See Bernie D. Jones, Southern Free Women of Color in the Antebellum North: Race, Class, and a “New
Women’s Legal History”, 41 AKRON L. REV. 763, 779 (2008) (noting that Ohio’s Black Laws of 1804 & 1807 required
any Black person traveling to Ohio to prove through a certificate of freedom that they were free and not a slave).
97 Paul Butler, Walking While Black: Encounters With the Police on My Street, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 10, 1997, at
23.
98 At his trial, Zimmerman claimed that Martin threw the first punch. Even though there was no evidence
corroborating Zimmerman’s account of who started the physical confrontation, during closing arguments, the defense
was permitted to show the jury an animated video of the events, which depicted Martin throwing the first punch. Patrik
Jonsson, Zimmerman Trial: For Jury, Anguished Task to Resolve Death of Trayvon Martin, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
(July 12, 2013) http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2013/0712/Zimmerman-trial-For-jury-anguished-task-toresolve-death-of-Trayvon-Martin (“An animated video shown by the defense showed Martin, in a hoodie, walking up to
Zimmerman, and punching him.”).
99 Angela P. Harris, Gender, Violence, Race, and Criminal Justice, 52 STAN. L. REV. 777, 785 (2000).
100 Yamiche Alcindor, Trayvon Martin: Typical Teen or Troublemaker?, USA TODAY (December 11, 2012, 7:13
PM) http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2012/12/11/trayvon-martin-profile/1761373/ (noting that Trayvon
Martin’s father was a Miami truck driver); Mary C. Curtis, What Chance Did Trayvon Martin, the ‘Suspect’ Have in
Court?, WASH. POST (July 15, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/she-the-people/wp/2013/07/15/whatchance-did-trayvon-martin-the-suspect-have-in-court/ (describing Martin as a “middle-class minor”); Daniel Trotta,
Trayvon Martin: Before the World Heard the Cries, REUTERS (April 3, 2012, 6:07 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/03/us-usa-florida-shooting-trayvon-idUSBRE8320UK20120403 (noting that
Trayvon Martin’s father worked as a truck driver in Miami).
101 Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity: Trayvon Martin, George
Zimmerman, and the Dilemmas of Desiring Whiteness, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1027, 1048 (2014). See also Harris, supra
note 99.
102 The prosecution embraced a colorblind strategy on the surface, but behind the scenes, they were very aware of
race and gender dynamics. During jury selection, the prosecution used six or seven of their ten peremptory challenges
to strike White females from the jury, prompting a Batson objection from the defense. The judge disallowed two of these
challenges, essentially finding that the prosecution had impermissibly relied on race and/or gender in utilizing their
peremptory challenges. As I note in a forthcoming book chapter, apparently someone on the prosecution team thought
race and gender mattered or they would not have tried so hard to keep White females from sitting on the jury. See Lee,
supra note 90.
103 Roig-Franzia, supra note 91, at A1.
104 Christopher A. Bracey, The Color of Our Future: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of the Race Card in American
Culture, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 91 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD THOMPSON F ORD, THE R ACE C ARD: HOW B LUFFING

who “plays the race card” is understood to be inappropriately claiming racial disadvantage. 105 The
race card accusation has been used so often by individuals who are hostile to discussions on race
that many people today will not call attention to race out of fear of being accused of “playing the
race card.” 106
The prosecution had reason to be worried that they would attract criticism if they called
attention to race. Some trial observers firmly believed the case had nothing to do with race.107
Some thought it was unfair to prosecute Zimmerman and make him “pay for generations of racial
inequities.” 108 Others believed Zimmerman was prosecuted “to placate angry African-American
voters and others who rallied to make the killing a cause.” 109
Defense attorney Mark O’Mara provided further support for the critics opposed to the
prosecution of Zimmerman, repeatedly opining that if Zimmerman had been Black, “he never
would have been charged with a crime.” 110 Actually, studies suggest that if Zimmerman had been
Black and had shot and killed a White male, it is very likely he would have been arrested,
prosecuted, convicted, and possibly sentenced to death. 111 Blacks who kill Whites are far more
likely to be prosecuted and sentenced to death than Whites who kill Blacks. 112
Aware that members of the community viewed the prosecution of Zimmerman as unfair scapegoating, the prosecution decided to try the case without referencing race—to take the colorblind
high ground. The problem is that by not calling attention to the possibility that Zimmerman thought
Martin looked suspicious because of deeply entrenched stereotypes about young Black men as
criminals, the prosecution encouraged jurors to see Zimmerman and Martin as just two young men
who got into a fight that tragically, but understandably, ended in death. By deliberately avoiding
any discussion of race, they erased Trayvon Martin’s race from the trial even though race likely
played a significant role in why Zimmerman thought Martin looked suspicious from the start and
why the jury may have found Zimmerman’s account of what happened that night credible. 113
Trayvon Martin’s race, however, could not be completely eliminated from the jury’s
consciousness. Jurors needed only to look at the autopsy photos of Trayvon Martin or observe his
parents in the courtroom to be aware of his race. In deciding whether Zimmerman honestly and
reasonably feared Martin, a necessary component of his self-defense claim, jurors quite possibly,
even if subconsciously, considered Martin’s race, and made the implicit association between black
males, criminality, and violence.
ABOUT B IAS M AKES R ACE R ELATIONS WORSE (2008)) (“The pejorative meaning we ascribe to the race card is sourced
from our collective perception that those who play the race card are abusing the rhetoric and legacy of racism and racial
injustice . . . .”).
105 Id.
106 For more on the “race card,” see R ICHARD T HOMPSON F ORD , T HE R ACE C ARD : H OW B LUFFING A BOUT B IAS
M AKES R ACE R ELATIONS WORSE (2008); Cheryl I. Harris, Myths of Race and Gender in the Trials of O.J. Simpson and
Susan Smith—Spectacles of Our Times, 35 WASHBURN L.J. 225, 229 n.10 (1995); Margaret M. Russell, Beyond
“Sellouts” and “Race Cards”: Black Attorneys and the Straitjacket of Legal Practice, 95 MICH. L. REV. 766, 773, 788–
93 (1997).
107 See, e.g., Joshu Harris, The Real Reasons the Trayvon Martin Case Should Be a Criminal Justice Poster Child,
61 DRAKE L. REV. DISCOURSE 46, 48 (2013) (opining that “the available evidence strongly suggests that race had little to
do with the deadly confrontation”).
108 See, e.g., Tom Foreman, Analysis: The Race Factor in George Zimmerman’s Trial, CNN (July 15, 2013, 9:10
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/14/justice/zimmerman-race-factor/.
109 Id.
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111 See Kang et al., supra note 15. See also text accompanying notes 14–15.
112 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 (1987) (finding that jurors imposed the death penalty in 22% of cases
involving Black defendants and White victims, but did the same in only 3% of cases involving White defendants and
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By ignoring race, prosecutors may have unwittingly exacerbated the effects of implicit bias.
A substantial body of research suggests that ignoring race leads jurors to assess Black defendants
more harshly than similarly situated White defendants, but these racially disparate results are
reduced when race is made salient. 114 If prosecutors had confronted race head on by making race
a salient feature of their trial strategy, they might have been able to convince the jury to see Martin
in a more sympathetic light.
B. Florida’s Stand Your Ground Law
The second critique Carbado leveled at the then existing scholarship on race and the Fourth
Amendment was its failure to fully examine the ways in which the Supreme Court’s Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence affected the everyday lives of persons of color.115 In contrast, much of
the existing scholarship on the shooting of Trayvon Martin reflects concern about the problem of
implicit racial bias and some scholarship is specifically focused on the impact of Stand Your
Ground laws on persons of color. 116
In 2005, Florida amended its self-defense statute, which previously required an individual to
retreat before using deadly force in self-defense if a safe retreat was known and available to the
individual. 117 Under Florida’s revised self-defense statute, dubbed Florida’s Stand Your Ground
law, individuals in Florida no longer have to retreat before using deadly force in self-defense. 118
Even if a safe retreat is known and available, an individual who is attacked while in a place where
he (or she) has a lawful right to be may use deadly force to repel the attacker. An individual has
no duty to retreat before using such force as long as “he or she reasonably believes it is necessary
to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the
commission of a forcible felony.” 119 The shooting of Trayvon Martin called attention to Florida’s
Stand Your Ground law because the Sanford Police Department referred to this law as the reason
why they did not arrest Zimmerman the night of the shooting. 120
While English common law required individuals to retreat to the wall before using deadly
force in self-defense if a safe retreat was known and available,121 a no-duty-to-retreat rule has long
114 Id. at 1586 (discussing race salience studies); Sommers & Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know About
Race, supra note 21, at 1027–28 (finding that presenting jurors with race relevant voir dire questions in cases involving
interracial violence reduced racial bias in White jurors); Sommers & Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom, supra note 21,
at 1367 (finding that in interracial domestic violence cases, White jurors were more likely to treat White and Black
defendants the same if the defendant referred to himself as a White or Black man when speaking to his girlfriend than if
he simply referred to himself as a man); Sommers & Ellsworth, “Race Salience” in Juror Decision-Making, supra note
21, at 600–03 (summarizing authors’ previous research on race salience); Sommers & Ellsworth, White Juror Bias, supra
note 21, at 202 (noting that “racial norms in society have shifted dramatically,” and that White jurors were more likely
to treat White and Black defendants equally if a defense witness spoke about the White or Black defendant being the
subject of racial slurs). While the social science studies on race salience have focused on whether making race salient
encourages jurors to treat similarly situated Black and White defendants the same way, it is likely that calling attention
to race can encourage jurors to treat similarly situated Black and White victims the same way as well.
115 Carbado, supra note 22, at 966.
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(2005), 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 351, 353–54 (2005).
118 FLA. STAT. § 776.012 (2013).
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120 Hanna, supra note 81 (Letter from Norton N. Bonaparte, Jr., ICMA-CM, City Manager (Mar. 19, 2012) citing
the immunity provision of Florida’s self-defense statute as support for its decision not to arrest Zimmerman). See also
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been a part of American self-defense doctrine. 122 In 1921, the U.S. Supreme Court approved of the
no-duty-to-retreat rule, noting that “[d]etached reflection cannot be demanded in the presence of
an uplifted knife.” 123 Today, thirty-three states allow individuals to use deadly force in self-defense
without requiring retreat. 124 In these states, an individual can use deadly force in self-defense
against another individual even if a safe retreat is known and available. Seventeen states require
retreat if a safe retreat is known and available. 125 In these states, if a safe retreat is known and
available to the defendant and he uses deadly force without retreating, he loses his right to act in
self-defense. Some states do not require retreat but allow the jury to consider whether a safe retreat
was known and available in assessing the reasonableness of the defendant’s belief in the need to
act in self-defense. 126 In these jurisdictions, if a safe retreat was known and available to the
defendant, the jury may conclude that it was not reasonable for the defendant to believe he needed
to use deadly force to protect himself from imminent death or serious bodily injury. 127
The Florida legislature went beyond simply eliminating the duty to retreat from its previous
law of self-defense. It also enacted a controversial immunity provision, which gives an individual
who reasonably believes in the need to use deadly force in self-defense immunity from arrest and
criminal prosecution. Florida’s immunity provision provides:
122
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18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(b)(2.3) (2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-11-440(C) (2006); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-18-4 (2006);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(2) (2012); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(c) (West 2012); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-401
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App. 1999) (noting that under Wisconsin law, the ability to retreat “goes to the reasonableness of the defendant’s
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(1) A person who uses force as permitted in s. 776.012, s. 776.013, or s. 776.031 is
justified in such conduct and is immune from criminal prosecution and civil action for
the use or threatened use of such force . . . unless the person against whom force was
used is a law enforcement officer, as defined in s. 943.10(14), who was acting in the
performance of his or her official duties and the officer identified himself or herself in
accordance with any applicable law or the person using or threatening to use force knew
or reasonably should have known that the person was a law enforcement officer. As used
in this subsection, the term “criminal prosecution” includes arresting, detaining in
custody, and charging or prosecuting the defendant. 128
Many commentators have opined that media attention on Florida’s Stand Your Ground law
was misplaced since Zimmerman’s self-defense claim would have been the same in a non-Stand
Your Ground state. For example, conservative commentator Ann Coulter told the press, “[T]his .
. . has nothing to do with ‘Stand Your Ground.’” 129 Coulter explained that if Zimmerman was on
the ground being beaten by Martin, there was no safe retreat available to him just before the
shooting. 130 Therefore, even in a jurisdiction that requires retreat if a safe retreat is known and
available to the defendant, Zimmerman would have had the right to use deadly force in self-defense
provided he met the other, usual requirements of the state’s self-defense law. Moreover,
Zimmerman did not claim immunity from prosecution as he could have under Florida’s immunity
provision. 131
While Zimmerman did not claim immunity and arguably could not retreat while he was on the
ground, Stand Your Ground nonetheless was a part of the Zimmerman case. For one thing, the jury
was instructed on Florida’s Stand Your Ground law. They were specifically told:
If George Zimmerman was not engaged in an unlawful activity and was attacked in
any place where he had a right to be, he had no duty to retreat and had the right to stand
his ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he reasonably believed
that it was necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or another
or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony. 132
Moreover, it is not clear that a safe retreat was not available to Zimmerman. Perhaps no safe
retreat was available to Zimmerman once he was on the ground with Martin on top of him, but
Zimmerman may have had the opportunity to retreat before the encounter got physical.
Additionally, even under Florida’s Stand Your Ground law, Zimmerman would have had a duty to
retreat if he was the initial aggressor. 133
128
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133 FLA. STAT. § 776.041 (2014) (The justification for using force in self-defense is not available to one who:
Initially provokes the use or threatened use of force against himself or herself, unless . . . [i]n good faith, the
person withdraws from physical contact with the assailant and indicates clearly to the assailant that he or she
desires to withdraw and terminate the use of force, but the assailant continues or resumes the use of force.).
What makes one an “initial aggressor” for purposes of self-defense is not very clear even in states that have
attempted to define the term.
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The Zimmerman case focused the nation’s attention on Stand Your Ground laws. This
scrutiny reveals that Stand Your Ground laws are not applied in an even-handed way. Just as the
race of the victim seems to affect outcomes in capital cases, the race of the victim seems to affect
outcomes in Stand Your Ground cases. A study of cases involving claims of self-defense in Florida
after passage of Florida’s Stand Your Ground law is instructive. The Tampa Bay Times studied
192 cases involving Floridians charged with crimes of violence who claimed self-defense under
Florida’s Stand Your Ground law and found that individuals who killed a Black person walked 73
percent of the time, while those who killed a White person went free 59 percent of the time. 134
Similarly, an empirical study by John Roman of the Urban Institute found that in both Stand
Your Ground and non-Stand Your Ground states, “[w]hite-on-black homicides [are] most likely to
be ruled justified (11.4 percent), while black-on-white homicides are least likely to be ruled
justified (1.2 percent).” 135 When he focused just on Stand Your Ground states, Roman found that
“controlling for all case attributes [other than race], the odds a white-on-black homicide [will be]
found justified [in a Stand Your Ground jurisdiction] is 281 percent greater than the odds that a
white-on-white homicide [will be] found justified.” 136 In contrast, “a black-on-white homicide has
barely half the odds of being ruled justifiable relative to [a] white-on-white homicide.” 137 These
studies indicate that Stand Your Ground laws are not being applied in a racially even-handed way.
C. Most of the Racial Critiques of the Case Have Ignored Zimmerman’s Mixed Race Identity
Carbado’s third critique was that the then existing scholarship on race and the Fourth
Amendment was under-inclusive because it focused primarily on Blacks and ignored other persons
of color affected by race-based policing. 138 A slightly different critique might be leveled at the
existing commentary on the Zimmerman case, most of which has focused on the fact that Trayvon
Martin was Black while ignoring or paying little attention to Zimmerman’s racial identity. Initial
news reports about the shooting either failed to mention Zimmerman’s race or referred to
Zimmerman as White. 139 Usually when a person’s race is not mentioned, it is because the person
is White and the speaker assumes that the reader will understand this.140 Rarely is the race of the
individual mentioned when the person in question is White because White is the default or assumed
race. 141
When it became clear that the public thought Zimmerman had racially profiled Martin,
Zimmerman’s father wrote a letter to the Orlando Sentinel, announcing that his son was not a racist
and was himself an ethnic minority since his mother was from Peru. 142 In declaring Zimmerman’s
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who went to trial were convicted at about the same rate as Blacks who went to trial. Black homicide defendants went
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138 Carbado, supra note 22, at 967.
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ethnic minority status as Hispanic and linking this status to the assertion that his son was not a
racist, Zimmerman’s father was relying on an assumption that (non-Hispanic) White equals racist
and minority equals non-racist. It is a fallacy to assume that only Whites can be racist. Whites do
not hold a monopoly on racial bias against Blacks. People of all races and ethnicities can be and
often are racially biased in favor of Whites and against Blacks. 143 As Tanya Hernandez points out,
“Racism, in particular anti-Black racism, is a pervasive and historically entrenched fact of life in
144

Latin America and the Caribbean.”
Similarly, Jerry Kang has noted that “Asian Americans
generally have implicit biases against African Americans that are almost as strong as those held by
Whites.” 145 The fact that Zimmerman was himself of mixed race identity and thus an ethnic
minority therefore does not mean he could not engage in racial stereotyping. Zimmerman could
have and most likely did rely on racial assumptions when he saw Martin and thought Martin looked
suspicious. Any one of us, myself included, could have had similar thoughts and beliefs.
CONCLUSION
We have come a long way from the days when it was risky business to write about race.
Nonetheless, the deeply entrenched belief that it is best to ignore race and racial difference—the
belief in colorblindness as an ideal—along with the specter of being accused of playing the race
card continues to hinder open race talk. From Justice O’Connor’s 1991 opinion in Florida v.
Bostick to George Zimmerman’s 2013 murder trial, we can see the ideal of colorblindness at work.
Being blind to race, however, can prevent the gears of the criminal justice system from working
the way they should. If we truly want to get beyond race, we need to stop erasing race from the
discussion.
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